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Beyond repair: Ruptures in the foundations of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
Rebecca Barlow and Shahram Akbarzadeh 
University of Melbourne 
 
A complex set of political and economic challenges have placed the Islamic Republic 
on the shakiest ground since its inception in 1979. Growing rifts amongst Iran’s top 
clerics and political elite have revealed the regime’s inability to pursue a coherent 
policy and project an image of unity on both the domestic and international stage. To 
make matters worse, the regime has been unable to provide social and economic 
security for its citizens in the face of harsh international sanctions and internal 
corruption. The Iranian Rial is severely inflated, unemployment is on the rise, and 
living standards are falling. At the same time, the state has shown worrying signs of 
militarisation, with the government increasingly relying on the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards, and its paramilitary wing, the Basij militia, to ensure political compliance and 
silence voices of dissent. Yet many opposition voices within Iran, including the Green 
Movement, continue to call for fundamental political reforms. 
 
 
Introduction 
In June 2013 a new Iranian President will be elected. Four years ago, the presidential 
elections sparked a mass uprising in the streets of Tehran and other major 
population centres, leading to the arrest of thousands of political activists. The 
country’s leading reformist politicians, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, 
remain under house arrest. It is highly unlikely that they will be permitted by the 
Guardian Council to run as candidates in the upcoming elections. 
Growing rifts amongst Iran’s top clerics and politicians have revealed the 
Islamic regime’s inability to project an image of unity and pursue a coherent policy. 
Deep political discord is damaging its ability to maintain a grip on the ideological 
legacy of its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini. The original advocate of the Islamic regime 
had kept himself above daily politics and cultivated an air of infallibility. The current 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has managed to seriously undermine that 
status and bring himself down to the level of daily politicking. This has made it 
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possible for his critics, within and without the regime, to criticise him and attack his 
office. This is most dramatically evident in the public rift between the office of the 
Supreme Leader, and that of President. 
To make matters worse, the regime is now unable to provide social security to 
its citizens due to tough international sanctions and domestic economic 
mismanagement. Runaway inflation and rampant unemployment rates have laid bare 
the Islamic regime’s inability to deliver social justice and equality. This is a colossal 
failure that goes to the heart of the regime. In the absence of a unifying ideological 
and political vision to mobilise popular support, and also the scarcity of resources to 
maintain social welfare, the ruling regime has found it increasingly necessary to rely 
on the tools of organised violence to enforce compliance. Relying on the loyalty of 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and its basij paramilitary wing to suppress dissent, 
the Islamic regime is exhibiting the limits of its political hegemony. Against this 
background, the opposition Green Movement has shown increasing signs of 
radicalisation, with many members openly calling for an end to the founding principle 
of the Islamic state, Velayate faqih – rule by the most learned Islamic scholar. 
The regime is on a downward trajectory for its political legitimacy, and in the 
absence of a major policy reversal, this is likely to become even steeper. This must 
be a worrying trend for the ruling elite against the background of popular, youth-led 
uprisings in the Arab world. With the retraction of its political legitimacy, the Islamic 
Republic is at risk of facing a similar revolt. 
 
Fundamental disagreements amongst the elite 
Following the heady days of 1979, the Islamic regime was built on a promise of 
delivering an indigenous and Islamic form of social justice and equality, along with 
freedom from the shackles of ‘westoxification’ – an unwelcome influence of the West, 
especially America. These grand ideals gave the regime an unprecedented level of 
popular support and the Iraqi invasion of 1980 helped consolidate that support-base. 
The Islamic regime took advantage of the revolutionary momentum and the external 
threat to purge its opponents within and without. By the end of the war with Iraq in 
1988 the regime had built a united core, free of conspicuous dissent. This political 
enterprise was helped with income from Iran’s vast oil deposits. The subsequent 
tension in the Persian Gulf region in the wake of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) 
helped drive up oil prices and offered the Islamic regime in Iran a windfall. 
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Yet it was clear from very early on that the Islamic Republic would be unable 
to deliver on its promises. From the inception of Velayate faqih the politics of 
oppression took root, as the regime sought to silence any voices of opposition to the 
ruling clerical elite. By the 1990s, a dismal human rights record left the Islamic 
Republic with a poor reputation on the international stage, and internal discontent 
was on the rise and rise. The ascendency of the reform movement under the 
presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) facilitated the articulation of an 
alternative vision for the Islamic regime, one built on greater social freedoms, 
economic liberalization, and cultural openness, especially with the West. The reform 
movement suffered a severe setback with the ascendancy of conservative president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, but its message of change proved durable enough 
to excite public support for reformist presidential candidates in 2009. 
The 2009 Green Movement uprising 
revealed a spectacular rift in Iranian 
politics, including multiple layers of 
discord within the establishment. Iran’s 
top echelon of power appeared 
unprepared for the intensity of the 
opposition movement, and divided on 
how to respond to the crisis. The 
emerging cracks went beyond tactical 
concerns about the legitimacy of force to 
disperse protest rallies, and raised 
questions that went to the very core of the regime: the role and responsibilities of the 
Supreme Leader. For the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a 
number of high profile clerics and government ‘insiders’, with impeccable credentials 
as advocates of the regime, took a public stance against the Supreme Leader. 
Former-Speaker of Parliament, Ali Larijani, for example, publicly declared the Interior 
Ministry as responsible for violence and unrest.1 And a former prominent journalist for 
Keyhan, the mouthpiece for government hardliners, Mohammad Nourizad, published 
several open letters to Khamenei, sharply criticising him.2  
The fracturing of regime solidarity had its roots in Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
staunch public support for Ahmadinejad’s presidential campaign against a 
background of wide-spread public unrest. This was an aggressive affront to the 
opposition candidate and his supporters, which included Hashemi Rafsanjani, then 
The Green Movement uprising revealed a 
spectacular rift in Iranian politics, including 
multiple layers of discord within the 
establishment. Iran’s top echelon of power 
appeared unprepared for the intensity of 
the opposition movement, and divided on 
how to respond to the crisis. 
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head of the 86-member Assembly of Experts charged with appointing and dismissing 
the Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani ‘fretted publicly over the regime’s decisions and the 
public support they were costing’.3 He angered hardliners by calling for the release of 
detained opposition members, stating ‘people are turning away from the clerics and 
seeking guidance from the students’.4 Rafsanjani was subsequently banned by 
Ayatollah Khamenei from leading Friday prayers in Tehran, and eventually lost his 
position as Chairman of the Assembly of Experts – the constitutional body charged 
with keeping the Supreme Leader accountable.5 But Rafsanjani was not alone in his 
open criticism of the incumbent President. Only two of Iran’s nine top clerics publicly 
congratulated Ahmadinejad on his return to office. A number of other high profile 
clerics, including Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei and Ayatollah Bayat Zanjani, publicly 
criticised the Supreme Leader for his hasty judgement.6 Such public criticism 
revealed the depth of discord at the very top of the Islamic regime. 
Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, a member of one of the 
most prominent clerical families from Shiraz, took up the case of the Green 
Movement by questioning the legality of the office of the Supreme Leader. Dastgheib 
argued Khamenei was in breach of the Constitution by pre-empting Ahmadinejad’s 
return to office, and since the source of the Supreme Leader’s authority was in the 
Constitution itself, Khamenei had placed his own role up for questioning.7 Dastgheib 
openly condemned the Assembly of Experts for remaining silent in the post-election 
turmoil. In an open letter to the Assembly, Dastgheib called on its new Chairman 
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, to ‘investigate what is going on in the 
country’, commenting ‘it strange that protecting Islam has been reduced to protecting 
one man’ – Khamenei.8 The late Ayatollah Montazeri was equally critical, and even 
employed the term estebdad – dictatorship – to condemn the Supreme Leader’s 
abuse of power following the elections, and called on the military and Basij to refuse 
orders given to beat protestors. Just a few months after the initial chaos, Montazeri 
made a public admission that what he and other powerful clerics had envisioned in 
Velayate faqih as the post-revolutionary system of governance was ‘a mistake’.9 
Following the disputed elections over 80 people were jailed, some for 15 
years, including a number of government affiliates. Government spokesperson 
Abdullah Ramezanzadeh, former vice-president Mohammad Ali Abtahi, and former 
deputy-economy minister Mohsen Safaie Farahani were amongst those put on trial. 
Speaker of Parliament and long-time confidante of Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Larijani, 
was accused of promoting ‘silent intrigue’ for not actively speaking out against the 
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protestors.10 Larijani was openly critical of the Guardian Council, which in his view 
had unlawfully supported Ahmadinejad’s return to office. He spoke out publicly 
against the government’s apparent willingness to simply ignore the thousands of 
Iranian citizens who maintained the election was rigged. Raja News, the hardline 
website closely linked to Ahmadinejad, published a story that was meant to condemn 
Larijani, but which only seemed to validate claims of electoral fraud. According to the 
news source, Larijani ‘had access to classified information’ on the afternoon of the 
election, and made a phone call to Mousavi to congratulate him on being elected as 
president.11 This has been viewed by some as a strong indication of who likely 
received the majority of votes, despite the eventual outcome.12 
Even the united front presented by Khamenei and Ahmadinejad quickly 
unravelled following the crushing of dissent. One of Ahamdinejad’s first moves in his 
second term as President was to appoint close confidante, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei 
to the post of Vice-President. Mashaei is well-known for championing a nationalist 
(Persian) rather than religious (Islamic) narrative of Iran’s history. This did not sit well 
with the Supreme Leader. Khamenei stepped in and dismissed Mashaei, citing the 
‘regime expediency’ as the reason. Ahmadinejad responded by appointing Mashaei 
as his Chief-of-Staff. The Supreme Leader’s overruling was embarrassing for 
President, but it was only a sign of things to come. In April 2011 Ahmadinejad sacked 
his intelligence minister for dismissing an official with close ties to Mashaei. 
Khamenei stepped in again, immediately overruling Ahmadinejad and reinstating the 
minister. Ahmadinejad responded to Khamenei’s move by refusing to attend 
Parliament and boycotting all government meetings for 11 consecutive days.13 
This dramatic run of events shattered the illusion of a united Islamic state. In 
reality, conservatism exists on a continuum in Iran, ranging from hardline to 
pragmatic. Supreme Leader Khamenei represents the first generation of Islamic 
rulers in Iran – those who remain firmly rooted in the ideology of the regime. 
Khamenei’s patronage consists of ultra-conservative political and clerical elites, and 
importantly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRG) which comprises some 250,000 
men (an important point to which we will return below). The politics of President 
Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, sit more towards the pragmatist end of 
conservatism in the Islamic republic. Ahmadinejad has been more successful in 
appealing to working class and rural Iran. The President represents the second 
generation of Iranian politicians since the revolution of 1979, many of whom served in 
the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). 
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The split between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad 
became so marked by 2012 that the Guardian 
Council banned some of the President’s 
supporters from running in the February 
parliamentary elections.14  Predictably, reformist 
candidates were also banned. This included 
both Mousavi and Karroubi who remained under 
house arrest and advocated ‘silent protests’ – a boycott of the elections. The result 
was a closed contest between the two conservative factions. Luckily for the 
Ahmadinejad camp, the ban did not include Mashaei, who is reportedly being 
groomed by Ahmadinejad to run as a candidate in the 2013 presidential elections. 
The special relationship between the President and Mashaei is a thorn in the 
establishment’s side, and further highlights the futility of rigid political labelling in Iran. 
Mashaei has promoted the slogan ‘Islam without the clerics’ – an approach no 
politician would have dared to take before.15 According to Hooshang Amirahmadi, 
president of the American Iranian Council: 
 
Mashaei is saying that Iranians are at first Iranians and Islam comes 
afterward. He is reviving a source of national pride of Iranians that has 
been neglected not only since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 but in the 
past two centuries...Obviously Mashaei’s nationalistic views are a threat 
to clerics. They are afraid that their power might wane if people begin to 
respect their pre-Islamic history.16 
 
Mashaei has been pegged as a likely candidate to run in the June 2013 presidential 
elections. But he is part of what Iran’s conservative media has labelled a ‘deviant 
current’ – that is, not part of the Supreme Leader’s camp.17 This is an ironic twist 
following Khamenei’s show of support for Ahmadinejad in the 2009 elections. In 
February 2012 Ahmadinejad was summoned before the Parliament and threatened 
with impeachment.18 This was the first time since the revolutionary days of the 
Islamic regime that such confrontation is played out at the very top of the political 
establishment. Not even the reformist President Khatami was threatened with 
impeachment when he was struggling with a conservative parliament in his second 
term.  
Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei promotes 
the slogan ‘Islam without the clerics’ – 
an approach no politician has dared 
take before. 
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According to Mehdrad Khonsari, an analyst with the Centre for Arab and 
Iranian Studies in London, public support for both Ahmadinejad and the Supreme 
Leader has declined as a result of the political standoff. Khonsari predicts ‘further 
polarisation, further disunity [and] rivalry...within a state structure that’s already 
fractured’.19 The forecast is shared by Karroubi, who despite being under house 
arrest since February 2012, sees no other option but change in Iran:  ‘If the nezaam 
[political system] is limited to people like Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Jannati [an arch-
conservative member of the Guardian Council], and similar people, then it is a boat 
that cannot accommodate 75 million people and is not stable’.20 Amongst the most 
remarkable comments of this nature are those issued by Morteza Nabavi, Member of 
Parliament and manager of Resaalat – a leading conservative daily. Nabavi has 
candidly revealed: ‘We [conservatives] do not have the required stability in the ranks 
of government officials. They do not all think alike, and are not united. We do not 
have this even among the Principlists [the self-appointed term of Khamenei’s 
followers]...Today, only a few defend the Supreme Leader.’21 
Remarkably, there have even been reports that members of the IRGC have 
dissented from official rank and file. In a news conference in mid-2010, Major 
General Mohammad Ali Jafari admitted support for the Green Movement amongst 
some members of the Guards, suggesting that events in Iran since June 2009 had 
created ‘ambiguities’ for some Commanders. Earlier, in February 2010, Jafari 
confronted Ahmadinejad during a session of the Supreme National Security Council, 
demanding that the president ‘have some shame’, and admit that, ‘it is due to your 
incompetence that Iran has been in chaos’.22 
 
The radicalisation of the opposition Green Movement 
The unprecedented displays of disunity amongst Iran’s top political and clerical elite 
occurred on the back of a more grassroots-led movement for change. In June 2009, 
millions of Iranians poured onto the streets of Tehran and other major cities to protest 
the return to office of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The protestors 
claimed this was a case of electoral fraud and demanded a recount of the ballots. But 
some went much further, demanding the downfall of the Supreme Leader; an end to 
Velayate faqih, the founding principle of the Islamic Republic. This was nothing short 
of a call for revolutionary change. But what further distinguished the 2009 protests 
from those of the past was the composition of the protestors themselves. Unlike the 
protests that peppered the late 1990s in Iran, which were secular-oriented and 
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student-led, the Green Movement emerged as something far more broadly based, 
transcending the politics of class, ethnicity, age, religiosity, and geographic location.23 
Afshari and Underwood observed how ‘religious moderates and reformist-leaning 
regime insiders...[lined] up with a broad swath of the Iranian public against a small 
cadre of regime hardliners and their minions’.24 
The Basij paramilitary force was deployed to break up the demonstrations. 
Police and militias raided university campuses and student dormitories. There were 
even reports that plain-clothed militias were authorised to use live ammunition 
against protestors.25 Most dramatic was the sniper killing of 26-year-old university 
student Neda Agha-Soltan, caught on the fringes of a protest 8 days after the initial 
uprising, who subsequently became something of a poster-girl for the Green 
Movement. A raft of beatings, arrests, and imprisonments ensued. Well-known 
advocates of change were threatened and many, such as human rights lawyer Shirin 
Ebadi, were eventually forced to leave Iran. Ebadi’s colleague, lawyer Nasrin 
Sotoudeh, was arrested in September 2010 without trial or charge; she was denied 
the right to attorney and banned visitation rights. The charge against her was ‘acting 
out against national security’ and ‘propaganda against the regime’, as well as ‘illegal’ 
membership in Ebadi’s Human Rights Defenders Centre. In January 2011, Sotoudeh 
was sentenced to eleven years imprisonment and prohibited from practising law for 
twenty years.26 Just over one year later in February 2012, Green Movement 
figureheads, reformist politicians Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, were 
placed under house arrest.27 
Advocates of rapid regime change may have underestimated the extent to 
which the regime was willing to go in order to crush the uprising. And the opposition 
movement was more complex than what it initially appeared to many outside 
observers. White House advisor Robin Wright noted discrepancies amongst the 
protestors early, warning in December 2009 that ‘the Green Movement does not 
speak in one voice; it is united in opposition only.’28  Regime change was not what all 
Iranian protestors were advocating. Initially, the Green Movement was entwined with 
the 2009 electoral campaign of presidential candidates Karroubi and Mousavi.  
Popular support for the reformists surged following a live televised debate on June 4 
between Mousavi and the incumbent Ahmadinejad, in which the latter appeared 
unprepared and lacking in policy content.  Reformist supporters initiated public rallies 
days before the elections.  The colour green was selected for its theological 
significance, traditionally designating those known as Seyyed in Shia Islam – direct 
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descendants of Ahl-al-Beyt, household of the Prophet Mohammed. In 1997, the 
campaign for former reformist President of the Islamic Republic, Muhammad 
Khatami, benefited from the same strategy. Khatami, a Seyyed himself, withdrew his 
nomination for president in 2009 in favour of Mousavi. In a symbolic act, Khatami 
used a pre-election gathering to place a green sash over Mousavi, showing support 
for a reformist colleague and fellow Seyyed. Making clear Moussavi’s status as 
Seyyed was meant to emphasise his religious credentials and suitability for the 
position of President of the Islamic Republic. 
In this way, the Green Movement spoke the language of the establishment in 
attempts to reject claims that any challenge to the status quo is by definition ‘un-
Iranian’ and ‘un-Islamic’. This cautious approach echoed Khatami’s presidency 
throughout 1997-2005. Khatami’s government argued that for the Islamic regime to 
remain vital, it would have to accommodate the basic needs of its citizens.  However, 
this need not necessitate systemic overhaul.  Rather, it could be achieved through a 
process of incremental, legislative reform.29  Khatami relied on a pragmatic and 
liberal interpretation of Islamic sources to justify his proposals for change to the 
ulama.  He employed religious discourse and the 
notion of ijtihad – Islamic reinterpretation of the holy 
texts – to demonstrate how internal changes would 
not necessarily transgress the boundaries of 
Velayate Faqih. In the early years of the reform 
movement, this approach to gradual reform looked 
set for some success. Throughout the late 1990s, 
Iran was characterised by a bourgeoning civil 
society.  There was an explosion of independent newspapers and an unprecedented 
wave of open debate and free expression.  Newspapers and magazines even began 
to play the role of political parties by representing various, and sometimes 
unorthodox, views on Islam and its relationship to the state.30  At the grassroots level 
social issues were increasingly discussed in terms of human rights, not as matters 
pertaining only, or primarily, to faith and religious exegesis.31 
It is the experience and memories of this kind of political stagnation that led 
many protestors in 2009 to question why they should remain tied to notions of 
‘reform’ of the Islamic Republic. Most young Iranian men and women were not 
witness to the heady years of the revolution – a time filled with idealism and hope 
that Islam would present the cure for all societal ills experienced under the Shah’s 
The reach of digital 
communications in Iran is a 
determining factor behind the 
failure of the regime to exert 
control over the flow of information. 
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pro-Western rule. Demographics play a strong role in the street politics of present-
day Iran. Youth represent the most prominent bulge in Iran’s population pyramid, and 
yet the official unemployment rate among those aged 15-24 years of age hovers 
around 23 percent.32 The resulting dissatisfaction with those in power is compounded 
by the state’s authoritarian mechanism of control over the media and means of mass 
communication. The state owns all six nationally televised channels, as well as most 
radio networks and newspapers in Iran. Yet at the same time, Iranians are savvy 
internet and mobile phone users. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iran 
ranked 35th globally in the number of internet users in 2009, placing them ahead of 
more likely countries such as Denmark, Finland, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Israel.33 In the same year, over 90 percent of Iranians were registered mobile phone 
owners.34 The reach of digital communications in Iran has been described as a 
determining factor behind the failure of the regime to exert control over the flow of 
information.35 Ramin Jahanbegloo has argued that ‘a new generation of civic actors 
will have a major part to play in writing the rules of the game in a changed Iran. 
Without doubt, this will entail ruptures with theocratic sovereignty and empower the 
republican gesture in Iranian society.’36 
Measures of ‘Islamic-ness’ are less concerning to young Iranians than their 
immediate social and economic realities.  Youth culture is characterised by a struggle 
against what many perceive to be intrusive state prescriptions on how to live and 
manage life, work, and relationships.  Deliberate improper wearing of the Islamic veil 
– bad-hejabi – for example, has become a widespread practice amongst young 
Iranian women.  Bad-hejabi involves letting the hair show at the front or sides of the 
veil, or wearing remarkably bright colours and patterns.  This is not simply a matter of 
fashion, but a symbol of desire to live in a society where individual choice is valued 
and respected.  In July 2007 Iranian feminist and aspiring poet Roxana Setayesh 
suggested why clothing is such an important issue to young Iranian women.  
Gesturing to her own outfit, a black hijab made of sheer material and patterned with 
red flowers, and a knee-length beige manteau, she asked: ‘Why do I have to wear 
this?  What does it mean?  It means I cannot choose.  I’m talking about choice on a 
broader scale.’37 
Since the decline of the official ‘reform movement’ of the 1990s, and the 
subsequent wholesale investiture of government hardliners, there has been an 
increasing trend in Iranian society to register dissent with the status quo. A good 
example is the ground breaking One Million Signatures Campaign, initiated in 2006. 
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The One Million Signatures Campaign is an effort by Iranian feminists of both secular 
and religious orientations to bring an end to all discriminatory laws against women. 
The focus of the campaign is not religious precepts, but international standards. ‘Iran 
is a signatory to the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights’, states the 
campaign website, ‘and as such is required to eliminate all forms of discrimination’.38 
By engaging in door-to-door and face-to-face street politics to educate Iranian men 
and women about their rights and the principle of gender equality, the One Million 
Signatures Campaign represents a shift away from theologically-bound discourse – 
including by those who may maintain strong personal faith in Islam. This kind of 
campaigning has its roots in a modernist rejection of Islamic law as the only frame of 
reference for the formulation of present-day laws to govern public and private life. 
Despite taking stands as frontrunners of the Green Movement, the political 
philosophies espoused by both Mousavi and Karroubi in the heat of the protest 
movement lagged behind the modernist end of Iranian society and culture. In the 
early days of the 2009 uprising, in fact, both politicians hesitated and called for a halt 
to protests. In January 2010 Mousavi emphasised a preference for incremental 
reform over political reconstruction, posting the following statement on his website: ‘I 
feel a burden of necessity to emphasise the Islamic and national identity of the Green 
Movement…and its loyalty to our Constitution...We believe in a compassionate 
reading of Islam.’39 Mousavi’s failure to distinguish his politics from the very 
constitution that mandates Velayate faqih, left some Iranians feeling high and dry. 
BBC analyst Mehrzad Kohanrouz reported on a series of comments submitted by 
members of Iranian civil society in early 2012 that reveal a great sense of frustration: 
‘Mousavi and Karroubi failed to keep up with the people’s demands. They put 
protestors off by calling on them to return to the political ideals of the Islamic 
revolution and the ‘golden era’ of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’; and ‘Leaders should 
be ahead of the crowd. As the protestors were shouting ‘Independence, Freedom, 
Iranian Republic’, Mousavi and Karroubi were still urging us to return to the values 
enshrined in by Ayatollah Khomeini’.40 
Protest rallies to mark the first anniversary of the June 2009 uprising were a 
reminder of the depth of disillusionment with the regime. Chants for the end of 
dictatorship, ‘Marg bar estebdad!’ (‘Death to the dictator!’), were common-place. 
Protestors burned the Supreme Leader’s photographs and called for his downfall. But 
the chants went beyond protesting those currently in power to implicate the future of 
the country at large: activists also shouted ‘Azadi baraye Iran!’ (freedom for Iran), and 
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‘mimirim, mimirim; harfesh nemipazirim!’ (‘We will die but never compromise’).41 
Yassamine Mather argues the Green Movement has moved down a path of 
radicalisation, due in part to the inability of Karroubi and Mousavi to ‘keep up’ with the 
popular protests.42 The movement’s radicalisation must also be attributed to the 
refusal of regime hardliners to engage in any form of negotiation, and their 
willingness, on the other hand, to resort to violence. Remarkably: 
 
Some Iranians are beginning to wonder whether nonviolent civil 
resistance is a viable strategy against a regime that has not hesitated to 
employ overwhelming violence and intimidation against peaceful 
protestors. They argue that the Islamic Republic is more akin to Qaddafi’s 
Libya than Mubarak’s Egypt, that is, more totalitarian than authoritarian, 
and that the Basij militia and Revolutionary Guards will not cede power 
without a bloody fight.43 
 
Whilst this is not a view shared by the majority of Iranians who have been strong 
advocates of nonviolent resistance, it is significant insofar as indicating the extent of 
civil society’s growing impatience for the regime’s antics. At the very least, the Green 
Movement has experienced radicalisation insofar as a now widely held preference for 
fundamental political overhaul.44 According to Ebadi, the Green Movement was never 
about a stand-alone election, but the political and economic management of the 
country as a whole. The protestors were not only expressing discontent with present 
leaders, she argues, but also demanding a more open and free society where public 
expression, human rights discourse, independent journalism, internet access, and 
economic freedom flourish.45 
There are some indicators that this revolutionary flavour on the ground has 
even influenced political reformists such as Mousavi and Karroubi. In recent months, 
Mousavi has backed away from former claims of loyalty to the Iranian Constitution, 
stating that since the Constitution is not God’s word, it is not unalterable. He has 
gone so far as to advocate Constitutional revision and the elimination of all 
‘undemocratic’ articles.46 This is reflective of the appetite for comprehensive change 
amongst broad cross sections of Iranian society, including the more traditional 
classes who, according to Sadjapour, ‘continue to believe strongly in Islam, but have 
lost their faith in the Islamic Republic’.47 
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The militarisation of Iranian politics: the role of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards 
 
Iranian politics have shown disturbing signs of militarisation. This trend has become a 
distinguishing feature of the Islamic regime. The IRG was created by Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1979 to protect the aims and interests of the revolution. Constitutionally, 
the IRG is barred from direct involvement in politics, and this prohibition was held 
firmly in place by Khomeini until his death in 1989. In more recent decades, however, 
the line between politics and the military in Iran has been seriously blurred. Major 
General Mohammad Ali Jafari has stated openly, in fact, that ‘before being a military 
organisation, the [IRG] is, first and foremost, a political-security organisation’.48 
According to the International Crisis Group, ‘Iranians generally view [the IRG] as the 
most powerful (and intimidating) pillar of the Islamic Republic’.49  
The major involvement of the IRG in Iranian politics can be traced back to the 
presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Under the influence of Commander 
Mohsen Rezai, the IRG lent unofficial support to Khatami’s rival, the conservative 
candidate Ali Akbar Natiq Nuri. One of Khatami’s first moves as President was to 
replace Rezai with the more moderate Yahya Rahim Safavi. But a culture of 
conservatism was already entrenched amongst IRG rank and file. At the height of the 
student protests of 1999, the IRG made it clear that it would no longer tolerate the 
reform movement. A conglomerate of IRG commanders threated Khatami with 
prospects of a military coup if he did not reign in the students. Faced with this threat, 
Khatami distanced himself from the students and called for calm.50 This move 
appeared to embolden the IRG, and accentuated a highly problematic pattern for the 
future. 
Since 2005, the conservative Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has 
witnessed the rise of former IRG officials into positions of political power and 
influence. Almost half Ahmadinejad’s cabinet consists of IRG veterans, as well as 
one-third of the 30 provincial governors.51 Eighty seats in the 290-member Majlis 
(parliament) are held by former IRG commanders.52 Former minister of commerce in 
pre-revolutionary Iran, Jahangir Amuzegar, argues plainly that Iran is ‘steadily 
moving from a theocratic oligarchy to a quasi-military dictatorship’.53 This is a stark 
assessment, but one that is validated to some extent by the role the IRG took in 
protecting the conservative status quo following the disputed 2009 elections. The 
Guards were charged with the responsibility of silencing the mass protests that 
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New rounds of international sanctions 
 
No account of the domestic Iranian landscape would be complete without taking into 
account the impact of international sanctions on Iran’s oil industry and financial 
sector. Since the early 1980s Iran has been the target of stringent bans on economic 
and diplomatic exchange designed to force the regime to halt its nuclear program 
and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But according to 
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, new measures introduced in late 2011 
and early 2012 constitute the most dramatic confrontation between Tehran and the 
international community in the long 30-year history of sanctions against Iran.58  
On 31 December 2011 US President Barack Obama signed a law that 
included measures to penalise foreign companies that do business with Iran’s central 
bank, which processes around half of Iran’s oil sales.59 This law allows the United 
States to bar non-compliant companies from the US financial markets. The obvious 
objective is to force Iranian submission to the inspection regime of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and compliance with its rulings, by hampering Iran’s ability to 
sell oil abroad and driving the Iranian economy down. These measures were soon 
followed by the European Union’s decision on 23 January 2012 to ban all imports of 
Iranian crude oil and freeze all assets belonging to Iran’s central bank. This was no 
short order, considering the EU accounts for around 20 percent of Iran’s total oil 
exports.60 Subsequently on 6 February 2012 the United States introduced further 
measures to freeze all property interests of the Iranian government, the central bank 
of Iran, and all Iranian financial institutions that come within US jurisdiction. 
Previously, US banks were required to reject and send back, rather than block and 
freeze, Iranian transactions.61 
A further major blow came when the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication – also known as SWIFT – announced it would cut ties 
with Iran as of the 2012 northern hemisphere Summer.62 With headquarters in 
Belgium, SWIFT handles around 97,000 banking organisations, security institutions 
and corporate customers in 209 countries around the world. SWIFT maintains a firm 
hold on the international financial market by issuing of SWIFT Codes, the 
internationally accepted standard format of bank identifier codes. Each bank around 
the world is issued with a unique SWIFT Code, which are required to securely 
transfer money between banks, and without which, international transfers cannot be 
completed. The financial world at large conducts its business through SWIFT, which 
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provides the only means through which international connections and 
communications can be made securely. When the decision by SWIFT to end 
operations with Iran comes into effect later this year, Iran will essentially be cut off 
from the international financial community, and be left with no means to engage in 
secure financial transactions. 
Washington’s effort to isolate Iran is directly aimed at changing the behaviour 
of the Iranian regime on the nuclear issue. But there is consensus amongst top Iran 
analysts that this scenario is far from likely. According to Takeyh and Pollack, in fact, 
‘there is no evidence to suggest that the policy of sanctions and dialogue has had a 
tangible impact on the perceptions of Iran’s leading decision-makers.’63 Others have 
argued that the latest round of sanctions have led to a further entrenchment of 
regime hardliners active measures to silence voices of reason and dissent.64 The 
Iranian regime reacted brazenly to the latest efforts towards international efforts 
towards economic and diplomatic isolation. Government spokesmen have insisted 
that the measures will not affect the operations of the central bank of Tehran, arguing 
that it does not engage in financial transactions with the United States anyway.65 
 
However, Iran cannot keep its back turned on the 
very real prospects of economic breakdown, nor 
the consequences this will have for maintaining a 
support base from within an increasingly frustrated 
and agitated populace. According to Takeyh and 
Maloney, the new measures will wreak havoc on 
Iran’s energy exports, which generate the majority 
of the government’s foreign exchange, and ‘take an 
enormous toll on the regime’s revenue stream’.66 
Mehrdad Khonsari, a former Iranian diplomat, argues that ‘due to the sanctions on 
banking transactions, the Iranian government and businessmen have to depend on 
money changers, which are not reliable and increase the cost by 20 to 30 percent. 
This has had a profound effect in aggravating the internal economic situation’.67  
Inflation is close to 40 percent in Iran, production has dropped along with 
purchasing power, investors are pulling out of Iran’s oil and gas fields, and the 
banking sector is grossly corrupted.68 The Iranian Rial almost halved in value 
between January 2011 and January 2012. Many average Iranians are struggling with 
serious issues of unemployment, unaffordable housing, and widespread ancillary 
The regime cannot turn its back on 
the very real prospects of economic 
breakdown. Inflation is close to 40 
percent and many Iranians are 
struggling to stay above the poverty 
line. 
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problems such as family breakdown, prostitution, and drug addiction.69 According to 
the Iranian government’s own statistics, one out of every six Iranians lives below the 
absolute poverty line.70 
The international sanctions regime may not prompt Iran’s hardliners to 
change tack on the nuclear issue. However, there is every chance that the 
deleterious effect of the sanctions on an already failing and grossly mismanaged 
economy will cause further divisions amongst Iran’s top politicians and clerical elite, 
and distance the Iranian public even more from a regime that refuses to negotiate. 
The latest talks in Almaty between Iran and P5+1 (the United Nations Security 
Council, plus Germany) in April 2013 were widely regarded as a failure. Some 
commentators have speculated that this is in part because of uncertainty surrounding 
who would be Iran’s president in three months’ time. Ultimately, it is Khamenei who 
determines Iran’s nuclear policy; with his attention now focused firmly on controlling 
domestic political scene, negotiations with Western powers may be far down on the 
agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Growing internal discord and a diminishing support base have made the Islamic 
regime extremely vulnerable. The guiding principle of the Islamic Republic, Velayate 
faqih or rule by the most learned Islamic scholar, is now increasingly question by the 
opposition movement, and even by members of the Ahmadinejad camp. The image 
of regime solidarity has been shattered by disagreements at the top. At the same 
time, internal economic mismanagement combined with the imposition of new and 
harsher international sanctions, threaten to cripple Iran’s economy.  While the regime 
has traditionally thrived in an atmosphere of tension and conflict, the country is now 
experiencing runaway inflation and living standards are falling rapidly. In the 
meantime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards have gained greater significance, not 
only as a security force but as an economic pillar of the state. The evolution of the 
IRG into a politico-industrial entity commenced soon after its formation and has 
continued unabated. This evolution gives the IRG an added vested interest in the 
survival of the Islamic regime, and allows the political elite to rely on it more 
conspicuously when confronted with political challenges.  
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In the face of a growing disillusionment with the Islamic regime at the grass root 
level, and a widening rift within the political elite, the regime has found itself relying 
more and more on the security apparatus. There is a direct correlation between these 
two trends. The more the regime loses its ability to garner political loyalty, the more it 
finds it necessary to enforce compliance through force. This is a slippery slope and 
puts the survival of the regime at risk.  
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